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CIviL LIABILITY OF BUSH, CHENEY, ET AL. FOR TORTURE, CRUEL,
INHUMAN, AND DEGRADING TREATMENT AND FORCED DISAPPEARANCE
Jordan J. Paust*
As documented in this article, treaty-based and customary international law
regarding forced disappearance, human rights, and the laws of war pro-
vides rights to compensation and forms of reparation. In particular, the
1949 Geneva Conventions expressly recognize private rights and contem-
plate compensation in courts of law. Within the U.S., several statutes ex-
ecute relevant international law for civil sanction purposes and several
federal and state court cases have recognized personal liability. The article
also demonstrates why there should be no immunity for conduct in violation
of international law, why substitution of the U.S. for individual defendants
should not occur, and why relevant international law has primacy over the
Military Commissions Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well beyond reasonable doubt that during an admitted "pro-
gram" of serial criminality designed to use secret detention and coercive
interrogation of human beings from the waning months of 2001 until 2009,
former President Bush, former Vice President Cheney, Alberto Gonzales,
and several other members of the Bush Administration authorized, ordered,
and/or abetted the forced disappearance of persons (a crime against humani-
ty and war crime), other war crimes (including torture, cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment of human beings and the transfer of non-prisoners of
war out of occupied territory), and other serious international crimes impli-
cating universal jurisdiction and a universal responsibility aut dedere aut
judicare (i.e., to hand over or to initiate prosecution of those reasonably
accused).'
Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston.
See generally JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE "WAR" ON TERROR (2007) [hereinafter PAUST, BEYOND THE
LAW]; Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate
Sanctions, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 1535 (2009) [hereinafter Paust, Torture]; CHRISTOPHER L.
BLAKESLEY, TERROR AND ANTI-TERRORISM: A NORMATIVE AND PRACTICAL ASSESSMENT
(2006); MARJORIE COHN, COWBOY REPUBLIC: SIX WAYS THE BUSH GANG HAS DEFIED THE
LAW (2007); PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN VALUES (2008); Jos6 E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
175 (2006); Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2085 (2005); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W.
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Types of relevant criminal responsibility include: (1) direct perpe-
tration of an international crime by authorizing or ordering its commission;
RES. J. INT'L L. 389 (2006); Benjamin G. Davis, Refluat Stercus: A Citizen's View of Crimi-
nal Prosecution in US. Domestic Courts of High-Level Civilian Authority and Military Gen-
erals for Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 503 (2008); David E. Graham, The Dual US. Standard for the Treatment and
Interrogation of Detainees: Unlawful and Unworkable, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 325, 352 (2009);
Aya Gruber, Who's Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1017 (2007); Scott Horton,
Kriegsraison or Military Necessity? The Bush Administration's Wilhelmine Attitude Towards
the Conduct of War, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 576 (2007); Aaron R. Jackson, The White House
Counsel Torture Memo: The Final Product of a Flawed System, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 149
(2005); Joseph Lavitt, The Crime of Conviction of John Choon Yoo: The Actual Criminality
in the OLC During the Bush Administration, 62 MAINE L. REv. (forthcoming 2009), availa-
ble at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1474940; Peter Margulies, Lawyers' Independence and Col-
lective Illegality in Government and Corporate Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized
Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REv. 939 (2006); Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: National
Security, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REv. 1 (2008);
Jamie Mayerfield, Playing by Our Own Rules: How US. Marginalization of International
Human Rights Law Led to Torture, 20 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 89 (2007); Jennifer Moore, Prac-
ticing What We Preach: Humane Treatment for Detainees in the War on Terror, 34 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 33, 55-56 (2006); Manfted Nowak, What Practices Constitute Torture: US
and UN Standards, 28 HUM. RTs. Q. 809 (2006); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban
on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIo ST. L.J. 1231 (2005); Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Law-
yers, HARV. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1471398
(last visited Oct. 13, 2009); Gabor Rona, Legal Issues in the "War on Terrorism"-
Reflecting on the Conversation Between Silja N. U Voneky and John Bellinger, 9 GERMAN
L.J. 711 (2008); Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares
from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1200 (2007); Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost
Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 309 (2006); Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless. Extraordi-
nary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333 (2007); Elizabeth Sepper,
The Ties that Bind: How the Constitution Limits the CIA's Actions in the War on Terror, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1805 (2006); Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water
Torture in US. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468 (2007); David Weissbrodt & Amy
Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 585
(2006); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91
CORNELL L. REv. 67 (2005); W. Bradley Wendel, The Torture Memos and the Demands of
Legality, 12 LEGAL ETHICS 107 (2009); Marlise Simons, Spanish Court Weighs Criminal
Inquiry on Torture for 6 Bush-Era Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009, at A6, available at
httpJ/www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/world/europe/29spain.html (discussing possible indict-
ments of Gonzales, Yoo, Addington, Feith, Bybee, and Haynes); Jordan J. Paust, The Com-
plicity of Dick Cheney: No 'Necessity' Defense, JURIST, May 18, 2009, http://jurist.
law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/05/complicity-of-dick-cheney-no-necessity.php (discussing the
inapplicability of a necessity defense to violations of customary international law) (last vi-
sited Oct. 13, 2009); Jordan J. Paust, Rice, Waterboarding and Accountability, JURIST, May
8, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/05/rice-waterboarding-and-accountability.php
(arguing that members of the Bush administration knowingly facilitated acts of torture) (last
visited Oct. 13, 2009); Interview with Ari Shapiro, All Things Considered, NPR (May 20,
2009), available at 2009 WLNR 9628215, at 2-3 (discussing how Gonzales "signed off'
several times on the use of a number of harsh tactics several months prior to the Bybee
torture memo).
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(2) complicity with respect to international crime where an individual was
aware that his or her conduct can or will facilitate conduct of a direct perpe-
trator; and (3) dereliction of duty with respect to those who exercised de
facto or dejure authority as a leader and refused or failed to take reasonable
corrective action.2
Prosecution of several lawyers within the Bush Administration for
complicity would be on firm ground, especially with respect to those who
wrote memoranda that facilitated the common, unifying plan devised by an
inner circle to use torture and other forms of coercive interrogation. As
noted above, criminal complicity can occur when a person is aware that his
or her conduct (e.g., writing a memo stating that waterboarding is not tor-
ture) can or will assist or facilitate conduct of a direct perpetrator. The per-
son who aids and abets need not know that the conduct of the direct perpe-
trator is criminal or, for example, whether the conduct constitutes "torture"
or cruel or inhuman treatment. It suffices that an accused was aware of the
relevant factual circumstances, and even a direct perpetrator need not have
known that his or her act amounted to an inhuman act either in the legal or
moral sense. Furthermore, all acts of assistance, either by words or acts and
omissions, that lend encouragement or support will suffice if the accused
knows or is aware that such conduct can or will facilitate the use of an illeg-
al tactic or form of treatment.
Are such former officials who are reasonably accused also subject
to civil liability for violations of treaty-based and customary international
law? The short answer is yes.
II. THE DUTY TO PROVIDE AND THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION
A vast array of international laws assures the right to fair compensa-
tion for secret detention and coercive interrogation. For the victims of tor-
ture, a mandatory duty to provide fair compensation, including means for
rehabilitation, is set forth in Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture:
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of
torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In
2 See Paust, Torture, supra note 1, at 1544-46 (discussing the possibilities of relevant
criminal liability); Jordan J. Paust, The Second Bybee Memo: A Smoking Gun, JuiuST, Apr.
22, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/04/second-bybee-memo-smoking-gun.php
(discussing the criminal liability that may result from the Bybee memo); Chimene Keitner,
Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HAST. L.J. 61 (2008); Guenael Mettraux,
Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia andfor Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 237, 297 n.323 (2002).
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the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his de-
pendents shall be entitled to compensation.
3
Other treaty-based and customary duties of states exist regarding rights of
individuals to an effective remedy, access to courts, and nonimmunity with
respect to torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Prominent
among these are the right to a remedy, access to courts, and nonimmunity
that are based in Articles 2(3)(a) and 14(1) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),4 as emphasized in the General Com-
3 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 14(1), openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter CAT]. Both sentences quoted contain a duty that is phrased in mandatory "shall"
language that provides textual clarity regarding the immediate mandatory duty and that is
typically self-executing. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 72, 90 n.98, 129-30 n. 14 (2003) [hereinafter PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW].
If there is even a need for statutory incorporation in view of such clear, immediate, and man-
datory language, federal statutes also execute the treaty-based right to a remedy. See infra
notes 9, 69-71. Article 14 of the CAT necessarily applies to acts of public officials covered
under Article 1 of the treaty and, therefore, Articles 1 and 14 necessarily assure nonimmunity
of public officials. See Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture to the United States, 14, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May
18, 2006), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/e2d4f5b2dccc0a4ccl2571
ee00290ce/$FILE/G0643225.pdf (stating that the U.S. "should recognize and ensure that
the Convention applies at all times, whether in peace, war or armed conflict, in any territory
under its jurisdiction .... ). See also id 15 ("provisions of the Convention... apply to,
and are fully enjoyed, by all persons under the effective control of its authorities, of whi-
chever type, wherever located in the world."); id 19 (there exists an "absolute prohibition
of torture ... without any possible derogation."); id. 28 ("The State party should ensure, in
accordance with the Convention, that mechanisms to obtain full redress, compensation and
rehabilitation are accessible to all victims of acts of torture or abuse, including sexual vi-
olence, perpetrated by its officials."); id. 32 ("The State party should ensure that all allega-
tions of violence in detention centres are investigated promptly and independently, perpetra-
tors are prosecuted and appropriately sentenced and victims can seek redress, including ap-
propriate compensation.").
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(3)(a), Dec. 9, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR] (stating that each State Party has a duty to
"ensure that any person whose rights... are violated shall have an effective remedy, not-
withstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capaci-
ty."); id art. 14(1) ("All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the deter-
mination of... his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.").
Both provisions are set forth with mandatory "shall" language that provides an immediate
duty and is typically self-executing. An attempted declaration of partial non-self-execution
with respect to Articles 1-27 of the ICCPR is incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty and void ab initio as a matter of law. See, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 3, at 362-66; infra note 5. In any event, the declaration expressly does not reach Article
50 of the treaty, which mandates application of all of the provisions of the treaty within the
U.S. See, e.g., infra note 6. Moreover, federal statutes execute the Covenant for civil sanction
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ments of the Human Rights Committee that operates under the auspices of
the ICCPR. 5 Article 50 of the ICCPR further mandates that all of "[t]he
provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States
without any limitations or exceptions.",6 This provision assures that rights
and duties under the treaty apply with respect to decisions and conduct in
Washington, D.C. as well as in judicial proceedings within the U.S. in
which claims to fair compensation proceed.
The rights to an effective remedy and access to courts are also re-
flected in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,7 which
purposes. See infra notes 69-71. Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR expressly applies to acts of
public officials and, therefore, necessarily recognizes nonimmunity of public officials. See
infra note 48.
5 See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 83-
84, 412-13 (2009); Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 82 (Tex. 2000) (citing U.N.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 13, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
143, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984) ("Article 14(1) requires all signatory countries to confer the
right of equality before the courts to citizens of all other signatories .... The Covenant not
only guarantees foreign citizens equal treatment in the signatories' courts, but also guaran-
tees them equal access to these courts.")); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment
No. 7, 1, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Add.1/963 (1982) ("Com-
plaints about ill-treatment must be investigated .... [And with respect to personal responsi-
bility,] [t]hose found guilty must be held responsible, and the alleged victims must them-
selves have effective remedies at their disposal, including the right to obtain compensa-
tion."); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20, 15, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/l/Rev. 1 (1994) ("States may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective
remedy, including compensation .. "); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No.
24, 11, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/Rev. 1/Add.6 (Nov. 2, 1994) ("[A] State could not
make a reservation to Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, indicating that it intends to
provide no remedies for human rights violations. Guarantees such as these are an integral
part of the structure of the Covenant and underpin its efficacy."); id at 12, 17 (stating that
"when there is an absence of provisions to ensure that Covenant rights may be sued on in
domestic courts . . .all the essential elements of the Covenant guarantees have been re-
moved[]" and that an attempted reservation to that effect is void ab initio as a matter of law
because it would be "incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.").
6 ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 50. Article 50 is set forth with mandatory "shall" language
that provides an immediate duty and is typically self-executing. Moreover, it expressly re-
quires that all provisions of the Covenant shall apply in all parts of a federated state without
exception. The United States had no reservation with respect to Article 50 and it clearly
operates directly within the United States. See PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at
362. Moreover, if there is even a need for statutory incorporation of such clear, immediate
and mandatory language, federal statutes also execute treaty-based rights to a remedy. See
infra notes 69-71.
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art.8, G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to an effec-
tive remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law"). On the nature of the Universal Declaration (1) as
customary international law, and (2) as an authoritative aid for interpretation of human rights
protected by and through the U.N. Charter, see, e.g., MYRES S. MCDOuGAL, HAROLD D.
LASSWELL, LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 272-74, 302, 325-
2009]
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mirrors patterns of generally shared expectations concerning customary
roots of the right to an effective remedy in domestic courts for violations of
human rights and various other rights under international law.8 As part of
human rights law, rights to an effective remedy and access to courts are also
necessarily part of U.N. Charter-based obligations of all members of the
U.N. to assure "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights .. .
Undoubtedly for this and related reasons, the U.N. General Assem-
bly emphasized in 2007 and 2008 that "national legal systems must ensure
that victims of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment obtain redress, are awarded fair and adequate compensation and
30 (1980); PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 181, 191, 198-200, 228 n.182, 246
n.372, 256 n.468, 286 n.595, 436-37 n.48; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir.
1980) (quoted infra note 9); Rodriguez Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 796-97
(D. Kan. 1980); U.S. Memorial before the International Court of Justice in Case Concerning
United States Diplomatic Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings; Me-
morandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980), at 9, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 593 (1980).
8 See, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 224-29.
9 See U.N. Charter, arts. 55(c), 56. See also Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883d plen. mtg.,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, 123-24, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970). ("Every State has the duty to pro-
mote through joint and separate action universal respect for and observance of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter."); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1980) (observing with respect to Articles 55(c) and 56 of the
Charter that:
The guarantees include, at a bare minimum, the right to be free from torture. This
prohibition has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and de-
fined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolu-
tion 217 (I1) (A) (Dec. 10, 1948) which states in the plainest of terms, 'no one
shall be subjected to torture.' The General Assembly has declared that the Charter
precepts embodied in this Universal Declaration 'constitute basic principles of in-
ternational law.' G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) [the 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law].
See also Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. 102-256; 106 Stat. 73 (1992), at pmbl. (the
express purpose of the statute is "[t]o carry out obligations of the United States under the
United Nations Charter and other international agreements pertaining to the protection of
human rights.") [hereinafter TVPA]. See also Memorandum for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in 19 LL.M. 585, 592
(1980) ("the Universal Declaration ... goes beyond the UN Charter in specifying and defin-
ing fundamental rights to which all individuals are entitled."); id at 602 ("mlt has long been
established that in certain situations, individuals may sue to enforce their rights under inter-
national law .... [The] international law of human rights . . . endows individuals with the
right to invoke international law .... As a result, in nations such as the United States where
international law is part of the law of the land, an individual's fundamental human rights are
in certain situations directly enforceable in domestic courts.").
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receive appropriate social and medical rehabilitation."10 Earlier, in the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation,11 the
General Assembly provided detailed information concerning the right to
"equal and effective access to justice" 12 and to an effective judicial remedy
for victims of violations of human rights law, 13 as well as the type of
"[a]dequate, effective and prompt reparation" and "compensation, rehabili-
tation, [and] satisfaction" required by international law. 14
With respect to the laws of war in particular, Article 3 of the 1907
Hague Convention (No. IV) 15 expressly recognizes that a belligerent that
violates the Convention "shall .. .be liable .to pay compensation."1 6 The
1949 Geneva Conventions expressly require that no state "shall be allowed
to absolve itself or any other ... of any liability incurred by itself or by
another... in respect of' grave breaches of the Convention. 17 The fact that
no state can absolve itself or another of liability is consistent with patterns
of expectation that liability for war crimes must continue despite an attempt
by a state to deny civil sanctions. The obligation to pay compensation also
serves to ensure that no state recognizes immunity with respect to such lia-
10 G.A. Res. 63/166, 18, U.N. Doe. A/RES/63/166 (Feb. 19, 2009); G.A. Res. 62/148,
13, U.N. Doe. A/RES/62/148 (Mar. 4, 2008). Similar prior resolutions with the same name
reaffirmed many of the points contained in the 2007 and 2008 resolutions. See, e.g., G.A.
Res. 61/153, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/153 (Feb. 14, 2007); G.A. Res. 60/148, U.N. Doe.
A/RES/60/148 (Feb. 21, 2006). Importantly, torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
are not merely treaty-based violations of international law (e.g., in the CAT, ICCPR, and law
of war treaties). They are also violations of customary norms jus cogens. See, e.g., PAUST,
BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 4, 141-43 nn.39-40, 184 n.40, 190 n.59; RESTATEMENT
(TIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(d) (1987).
1" G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doe. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Basic Prin-
ciples]. For more detailed exposition of the principles and their development, see, e.g., M.
Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims' Rights, 6 HuM. RTS. L. REv. 203,
260-74 (2006).
12 Basic Principles, supra note 11, at Annex, part II, 3(c); id. part VII, 11 (c).
13 Id. at pmbl., part VIII, 7 12.
14 Id. part IX, TT 15-22.
15 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV Convention),
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter HC IV] (establishing the formal
statements of the laws of war and war crimes in international law). At least by 1939 the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg recognized that the HC IV reflected customary
international law. See, e.g., Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal
(Oct. 1, 1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1947); see also JORDAN J. PAUST ET. AL,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 6, 463, 639 (Carolina Academic
Press 2007) (1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW].
16 HC IV, supra note 15, art. 3. Regarding Supreme Court recognitions of nonimmunity
for violations of the laws of war and neutrality in the years 1950, 1917, 1822, and 1808, see
infra note 48.
17 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 148,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
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bility. More generally, the Geneva Conventions expressly recognize and
provide various private rights and contemplate compensation in courts of
law. 18 In fact, private judicial remedies predate the Conventions and have
existed more generally with respect to violations of treaty-based and custo-
mary laws of war since the beginning of the U.S. 19 Article 91 of Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions 20 reaffirms widespread expectations with respect
to state responsibility for war crimes and the propriety of compensation as a
sanction response. Article 91 stresses that a party to an international armed
conflict that "violates the provisions of the [Geneva] Conventions or of this
Protocol shall ... be liable to pay compensation. 2 1 In 1990, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council reaffirmed such forms of responsibility with respect to Iraqi
violations of the Geneva Conventions. Iraq, the Council declared, is "liable
for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to ... [certain states] and
18 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 516 nn.43-45 (2004), and cases cited [he-
reinafter Paust, Judicial Power]; 1 COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK 1N ARMED FORCES IN THE
FIELD 83-84 (1952) (stating that rights exist and claims are "to be evoked before an appro-
priate national court by the protected person who has suffered the violation." (emphasis
added)); 3 COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
OF WAR 630 (1960) (stating that a violator state is "liable to pay.., material compensation
for breaches of the Convention .... ); 4 COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 209-11 (1958) (providing the re-
sponsibilities of states and individuals); infra note 24. Certain rights in the Geneva Conven-
tions are not only self-executing (see, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 71-72,
134-35 n.10, 219-20 n.43; Paust, Judicial Power, supra at 515-16), but they are also ex-
ecuted for civil sanction purposes by a number of federal statutes. See, e.g., infra notes 69-
72. Concerning the fact that the U.S. military was involved in an international armed conflict
in Afghanistan, see, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW supra note 1, at 1-3, 7, 10, 47.
19 See, e.g., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) (quoted infra note 96); The Pa-
quete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 698 (1900); id. at 714; Freeland v. Williams, 131 U.S. 405,416
(1889) ("no civil liability attached" when no war crime occurred); Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S.
594, 605-06 (1878) (stating that individuals are relieved from civil liability where no war
crime occurred); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1851) (suit could be
brought in "any district in which the defendant might be found"); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 37, 43-45 (1800) (Chase, J., concurring); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 279
(1796) (Iredell, J., concurring) ("rights... derived from the laws of war... and in that case
the individual might have been entitled to compensation .... "); Royal Holland Lloyd v.
United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 722, 748 (1931) (stating in dictum that prisoners of war have per-
sonal rights and can pursue "[c]laims for losses based on personal injuries, death, [or] mal-
treatment to prisoners of war .... "); PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 63-64
n.130, 226-27, 291-92 nn.488-95 (addressing several other state court cases). Concerning
Supreme Court recognition of nonimmunity in 1822 and 1917, see generally infra note 48.
20 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
protection of victims of international armed conflict (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3.
21 Id. art. 91.
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their nationals, 22 and is "liable under the Convention . . . [for] grave
breaches committed by it, as are individuals ....23
More recently, the practice of providing private judicial remedies
for violations of the laws of war has been further effectuated in a growing
number of modern cases that have recognized personal liability as well as
the liability of private juridic persons. 24 It is important in this regard that
there has been unswerving recognition in every relevant judicial opinion
since the beginning of the U.S. that the President and all persons within the
Executive branch are bound by the laws of war. 5 Since the President has no
authority to violate international law, authorizations to do so are ultra vires
and the conduct of compliant subordinates remains unlawful.26
22 S.C. Res. 674, 11 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0674 (Oct. 29, 1990).
23 S.C. Res. 670, 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0670 (Sept. 25, 1990).
24 For modem cases addressing war crimes liability under the Geneva Conventions and
other laws of war, see Weisshaus v. Swiss Bankers Ass'n, 225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000);
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that "command respon-
sibility" is well accepted in U.S. and international law); Kadic v. Karad~i6, 70 F.3d 232,
242-43 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d
332, 336-37 (1 1th Cir. 1992); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp.2d 257, 279-80
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); Est. of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., Inc., 256 F. Supp.2d 1250 (N.D. Ala.
2003); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.2d 289, 310-11
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Cabello Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F. Supp.2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(stating that international conventions have held individuals responsible); Mehinovic v.
Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp.2d 1322, 1350-54, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2002); In re World War II Era
Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F. Supp.2d 939, 946-47 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (recogniz-
ing international agreements to settle private claims); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F.
Supp.2d 117, 127-28 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8
(D.D.C. 1998); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 171-72 (D. Mass. 1995) (examining
leader liability). See also Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F. Supp.2d 179 (D.D.C. 2003) (ex-
amining through dictum law of war violations as relevant background with respect to liability
of Iraq and tort causes of action), rev'don other gds., 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
25 See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 20-23, 72-75, 86, 88-89, 92, 169-
72. See also Paust, Judicial Power, supra note 18, at 519-24 (demonstrating the President's
duty is constitutionally-based, since under Article II, § 3 of the Constitution the President has
an unavoidable duty to faithfully execute the laws, including international law). See also
PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 169-73 (asserting that the President of the U.S.
is bound to obey customary international law).
26 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804) (stating that "orders
given by the executive" or executive "instructions cannot change the nature of the transac-
tion, or legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a plain trespass"
and "[i]f his instructions afford him no protection, the law must take its course ...."); Ex
parte Orozco, 201 F. 106, 111-12, 118 (W.D. Tex. 1912) (stating that conduct resting "mere-
ly upon an order directed by the President" was illegal and cannot "be sustained in a court of
justice."); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1220-21, 1228-31 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806)
(No. 16,342) (Paterson, J., on circuit) (stating that the President is bound by the law and
cannot "dispense with its execution, and still less can he authorize a person to do what the
law forbids" and if the President approved a violation, "it would not justify the defendant in a
court of law, nor discharge him from the binding force" of the law); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297,
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With respect to the customary andjus cogens crime against humani-
ty and violation of the laws of war known as forced disappearance or secret
detention, 27 which was also engaged in as part of an admitted Bush pro-
gram, 28 it is significant that the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons From Enforced Disappearance 29 affirms expectations of the
international community that each state party "shall ensure in its legal sys-
tem that the victims of enforced disappearance have the right to obtain repa-
ration and prompt, fair and adequate compensation" and that reparation
"covers material and moral damages and, where appropriate, other forms of
reparation such as: (a) [r]estitution; (b) [r]ehabilitation; (c) [s]atisfaction,
including restoration of dignity and reputation; [and] (d) [g]uarantees of
non-repetition.,
30
Within the Americas, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
awarded compensation to the family of a victim of forced disappearance in
the now famous Velasquez Rodriguez case.31 Article 63(1) of the American
Convention on Human Rights 32 allows the Inter-American Court to decide
"that fair compensation be paid to the injured party." 33 As recognized by the
Inter-American Court in a later case, Article 63(1) "codifies a rule of cus-
tomary international law which is one of the fundamental principles of
299-300 (1865) (explaining that the laws of war "are of binding force upon the departments
and citizens of the Government" and the Government cannot "abrogate them or authorize
their infraction."). See also supra note 25.
27 See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 34-41 (describing why secret detentions,
renditions and forced disappearances violate customary international law); RESTATEMENT
(TnuRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(c) cmt. a, c, n, RNs
1, 11 (1987) (discussing the scope ofjus cogens).
28 See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 12, 28, 30, 32.
29 See G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006).
30 Id. art. 24 (4)-(5); see also id. pmbl. ("[T]he right of victims to justice and to repara-
tion."). The right to "an effective remedy" and "adequate compensation" for victims of en-
forced disappearance was recognized earlier by the General Assembly in its 1992 Declara-
tion on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, G.A. Res. 47/133, arts.
9, 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (Feb.12, 1993). See also id. art. 5 (stating such conduct
renders "perpetrators and the State or State authorities which organize, acquiesce in or tole-
rate such disappearances liable under civil law .... ").
31 VelAsquez Rodriguez Case (Compensatory Damages Judgment), Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/ser. C./No. 7, at 123 (Jul. 21, 1989), addressed in RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST
HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 799-
802 (1995).
32 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No.36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
" Id. art. 63(1).
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modem international law, that being the responsibility of States ... to make
reparation., 34 More recently, the Court declared:
It is a principle of International Law that any breach of an international ob-
ligation resulting in harm gives rise to the duty to adequately redress such
harm .... The obligation to compensate is governed by International Law
and it may be neither modified nor disregarded by the State in reliance
upon its domestic law.
The reparation of the damage flowing from a breach of an international ob-
ligation calls for, if practicable, full restitution (restitutio in integrum),
which consists in restoring a previously-existing situation. If not feasible,
the international court will then be required to define a set of measures
such that, in addition to ensuring the enjoyment of the rights that were vi-
olated, the consequences of those breaches may be remedied and compen-
sation provided for the damage thereby caused. In addition, there is also
the State's obligation to adopt affirmative measures to guarantee that no
injurious occurrences such as those analyzed in the case at hand will take
place in the future.
35
Although the U.S. has not yet ratified the American Convention,
within the U.S., at Guantdnamo, and elsewhere in the Americas, the U.S. is
bound to take no action inconsistent with the object and purpose of the
Convention. Such actions would necessarily include orders, authorizations,
complicity, and other acts in violation of the human rights to freedom from
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and the right to "fair
compensation" that are protected in the Convention. This obligation arises
because the U.S. signed the treaty in 1977 while awaiting ratification.36 Ad-
ditionally, the U.S. is bound by the American Declaration of the Rights and
34 Garrido and Baigorria Case (Reparations), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. C./No. 39, 9 40
(Aug. 27, 1998); see also id. 9 41, 47-65, 73 ("The case law of this Court has consistently
been that the State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights viola-
tions and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations
committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate
punishment, and to ensure the victim adequate compensation."); id. 74 (there is a "legal
obligation to investigate ... and to bring to trial and punish the authors, accomplices, acces-
sories after the fact, and all those who may have played some role in the events that
transpired.").
35 Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. C./No.162, 9 199-201 (Nov.
29, 2006). The Court added: "Reparations are measures aimed at removing the effects of the
violations. Their nature and amount are dependent upon the specifics of the violation and the
damage inflicted at both the pecuniary and non pecuniary levels. These measures may neither
enrich nor impoverish the victim or the victim's beneficiaries, and they must bear proportion
to the breaches declared as such in the Judgment." Id. 202 (footnote omitted).
36 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 ("A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty ... subject to ratification").
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Duties of Man. 37 The American Declaration affirms that "[e]very human
being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person"; 38 "[e]very
individual who has been deprived of his liberty ... has the right to humane
treatment"; 39 and "[e]very person may resort to the courts to ensure respect
for his legal rights."
40
Reparations-including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation
for victims of enforced disappearance,41 other crimes against humanity,
genocide, and war crimes-can also be ordered "directly against a convicted
person" by the International Criminal Court (ICC). 42 Although the U.S. has
yet to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC, it is possible that a U.S. national
will be prosecuted before the ICC under certain circumstances. For exam-
ple, when a crime is authorized, ordered, or abetted and is perpetrated in
territory of a party to the treaty (e.g., in Afghanistan), then the ICC could
provide civil sanctions against a convicted U.S. national.43
17 O.A.S. Res. XXX, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser.L./V./I.4, rev. (1965) [hereinafter Ameri-
can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man]. As a party to the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, the U.S. is bound by the American
Declaration, which is a legally authoritative indicia of human rights protected through Article
3(k) of the O.A.S. Charter. See id. arts. 44, 111. See, e.g., Interpretation of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
(ser. A) No. 10, 45, 47 (July 14, 1989); Inter-Am. C.H.R, Report on the Situation of Hu-
man Rights in Ecuador, ch. VIII, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 Doc. 10 rev. 1 (Apr. 24, 1997) ("The
American Declaration... continues to serve as a source of international obligation for all
member states...."); The "Baby Boy" Opinion, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, Res. No.
23/81, 16, OEA/Ser.LJV/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981) (stating that "[a]s a consequence of
Article 3i, 16, 51e, 112 and 150 of [the O.A.S. Charter], the provisions of other instruments
and resolutions of the OAS on human rights acquired binding force. Those instruments and
resolutions approved with the vote of the U.S. Government" include the American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man. That Declaration affirms several human rights, now
protected through the O.A.S. Charter, including the right to "resort to the courts to ensure
respect for ... [one's] legal rights" documented in Article XVIII); Roach Case, No. 9647,
Inter-Am. C.H.RI 147, 48, OEA/Ser.LJV/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). See also LILLICH &
HANNUM, supra note 31, at 802-04; MYREs S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY
198, 316 (1980); DAVID WEISSBRODT & FRANK NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 598-600 (1996).
38 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 37, art. I.
'9 Id. art. XXV.
40 Id. art. XVIII.
41 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(i), (2)(i), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
42 See id. art. 75(1)-(2). It is also declared within Article 75 that "[n]othing in this article
shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under national or international law."
Id. art. 75(6).
43 See, e.g., id arts. 12(2)(a), 13, 14(1), 15(1); Paust, Torture, supra note 1, at 1571-72,
1571 n.I11.
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With respect to civil sanctions, Justice Breyer recognized more
generally in 2004 that universal jurisdiction that pertains with respect to
"torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes... necessarily
contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery." 44 In fact, over the
last thirty years, a remarkable number of U.S. cases have recognized the
right to civil remedies against individuals, juridic persons, and states-not
merely for violations of the laws of war, 45 but also for torture, cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment in violation of other treaty-based and other
customary international law, 46 and forced disappearance of persons. 47 Sev-
eral cases have also recognized the unavoidable fact that violations of inter-
national criminal law and human rights law cannot be lawful "official" or
"public" acts of state and are not entitled to any form of immunity.41 In fact,
44 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762-63 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). Con-
cerning universal jurisdiction over relevant violations of international law, see, e.g., PAUST,
BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 49, 167 n.155; PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
3, at 420-23; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF T-E UNITED
STATES § 404, cmnts. a-c (1987).
45 See supra note 24.
46 See, e.g., Cabello v. Femdndez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157-59, 1158, 1161 (1 1th Cir.
2005) (regarding torture and crimes against humanity); Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Kadic v.
Karadii6, 70 F.3d 232, 242-43, 245 (2nd Cir. 1995); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Ar-
gentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Cabello Barrueto v. Ferndndez-Larios,
205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322,
1344-49 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345,
1360-61 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Jama v. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 363 (D.N.J. 1998); Doe v.
Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1998) (including that covered under
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions); In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1460,
1462-63 (D. Haw. 1995); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul
v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (torture).
47 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994);
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2007 WL 2349336 at *29 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
("there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of... forced disappearance [in Nigeria] to sup-
port tort claims"); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp.2d 401, 416, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184-85, 172 (quoting S. REP. No. 249, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1991) regarding disappearance claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act);
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 710-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
48 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1210 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that
"acts of racial discrimination cannot constitute official sovereign acts") (quoting Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1992) ("International law does
not recognize an act that violates jns cogens as a sovereign act.")); Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408
F.3d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., dissenting in part) ("[O]fficials receive no immun-
ity for acts that violate internationaljus cogens human rights norms (which by definition are
not legally authorized acts)."); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002);
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 967 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting West v. Multi-
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banco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[V]iolations of international law
are not 'sovereign' acts."); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471-72 (9th
Cir. 1994) (human rights violations, including torture, are not lawful public acts of state); Liu
v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432-34 (9th Cir. 1989) (act of state doctrine not ap-
plied to assassination, which is not in the "public interest" and a strong international consen-
sus exists that it is illegal); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2007 WL
2349345, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (quoting Siderman, 965 F.2d at 718); Presbyte-
rian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 289, 344-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(stating that adjudication of genocide, war crimes, enslavement, and torture is not barred by
the act of state doctrine); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F.Supp. 1189, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (defendant could not argue that torture fell within the scope of his authority); Xuncax
v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp 162, 176 ((D. Mass. 1995) ("these actions exceed anything that
might be considered to have been lawfully within the scope of Gramajo's official authority.")
(quoting DeLetelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980) (assassination
is "clearly contrary to precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international
law" and "there is no discretion to commit, or to have one's officers or agents commit, an
illegal act;" therefore, assassination cannot be part of official's "discretionary" authority));
Paul v. Avril, 812 F.Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (rejecting defendant's argument regard-
ing the act of state and political question doctrines as "completely devoid of merit" because
the acts of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and arbitrary detention in viola-
tion of customary international law "hardly qualify as official public acts" and holding that
the claims present "clearly justiciable legal issues"); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F Supp.
1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (torture, arbitrary detention, and summary execution "are not
public official acts"); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765, 789 (1950) (no form of
immunity exists for war crimes in violation of Geneva law); Berg v. British & African Steam
Nav. Co., 243 U.S. 124, 147, 152-56 (1917) (jurisdiction recognized regarding German
government's violation of the law of nations and relevant treaties and nonimmunity existed
because "an illegal capture would be invested with the character of a tort" and jurisdiction is
not obviated despite the intervention of the German ambassador and a claim that since pro-
ceedings had been instituted in Germany that the U.S. court should decline); The Santissima
Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 350-55 (1822) (property taken by a foreign ship of war in
violation of the law of nations is not immune and "is liable to the jurisdiction of our Courts"
and if "a foreign sovereign... comes personally within our limits... he may become liable
to judicial process in the same way"); Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 293, 294
(1808) (acts violative of the law of nations are not entitled to recognition); Rose v. Himely, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch.) 241, 276-77 (1808); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (1 1th Cir.
1996) ("In Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 337 (1 1th Cir. 1992), we held that the
political question doctrine did not bar a tort action instituted against Nicaraguan Contra lead-
ers [for war crimes in violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions]. Conse-
quently, we reject Negewo's contention in light of Linder."); Daventree, Ltd. v. Republic of
Azerbaijan, 349 F. Supp.2d 736, 755 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("the Act of State doctrine only
applies to valid acts of state."); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp.2d 38, 52-54
(D.D.C. 2000) ("nations that operate in a manner inconsistent with international norms
should not expect to be granted the privilege of immunity from suit"), quoted in Elahi v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 106 (D.D.C. 2000); Flatow v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 24 (D.D.C. 1998) ("bus bombings and other acts of international
terrorism are not valid acts of state .... ); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892-95
(C.D. Cal. 1997) ("Because nations do not, and cannot under international law, claim a right
to torture ... a finding that a nation committed such acts ... should have no detrimental
effect on the policies underlying the act of state doctrine. Accordingly, the Court need not
apply the act of state doctrine in this case."); United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.Cas.
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state authority or sovereignty is conditioned on obedience to international
law. It is the law upon which sovereignty rests. As the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg recognized, acts in violation of international crimi-
nal law-including violations of the laws of war-are ultra vires or beyond
the lawful authority of any state:
The doctrine of sovereignty of the State . . . cannot be applied to acts
which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of
these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position .... He
who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pur-
suance of the authority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves
outside its competence under international law. 49
832, 846-51 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,551) (the law of nations "may be enforced by a
court of justice, whenever it arises in judgment" and, with respect to "an offence against the
universal law of society," "no nation can rightfully permit its subjects to carry in on, or ex-
empt them ... [and] no nation can privilege itself to commit a crime against the law of na-
tions ...."); S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3-8 (1991) (Since the act of state doctrine "applies only
to 'public' acts, and no state commits torture as a matter of public policy, this doctrine cannot
shield former officials from liability," adding: "[a] state that practices torture and summary
execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law. Consequently, the [TVPA] is designed to
respond to this situation by providing a civil cause of action in US courts" and the Senate
Judiciary "Committee does not intend the 'act of state' doctrine to provide a shield from
lawsuit .. "); 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 357 (1859) ("A sovereign State who tramples upon the
public law of the world cannot excuse himself by pointing to a provision of his own munici-
pal code."); General Comment No. 20, supra note 5, 2, 13, 15 (victims have a "right to an
effective remedy, including compensation" whether violators of Article 7 were "public offi-
cials or other persons acting on behalf of the State, or by private persons" "acting in their
official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity"); supra note 26.
49 Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 15. Important-
ly, since no state has authority to participate in international crimes and state sovereignty is
not relevant when international crimes have been committed, "foreign policy" should also be
irrelevant, states are on notice that international criminal conduct is without authority, and no
state can rightly be embarrassed by inquiry into its international criminal activity or acta
contra omnes. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Preliminary
Motions, 26-34 (Nov. 8, 2001) (lack of head of state immunity for alleged international
crimes is "a rule of customary international law"); Prosecutor v. Furundlija, IT-95-17/1-T,
Trial Chamber Judgment, 153-55 (Dec. 10, 1998) (the prohibition of torture is "a peremp-
tory norm of jus cogens" and as such "it serves to internationally de-legitimise any legisla-
tive, administrative or judicial act authorizing torture" and "would not be accorded interna-
tional legal recognition"); Barrios Altos v. Peru, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. C./No. 75,
Merits Judgment, 41 (Mar. 14, 2001) (amnesty laws "and establishment of measures de-
signed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to
prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights viola-
tions such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced
disappearance .... ). See also Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case
No. 137/1997, Judgment (Ct. of First Instance of Leivadia 1997), extract addressed in Peter
Bekker, International Decisions, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 751,
766 (1999) ("The acts of a state that violate jus cogens norms do not have the character of
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During the subsequent Nuremberg proceedings, the tribunal in
United States v. Von Leeb noted that "[i]nternational law operates as a re-
striction and limitation on the sovereignty of nations"; that Hitlerian direc-
tives might have had the force of domestic law; to recognize such directives
as a defense to international crime "would be to recognize an absurdity" that
international law "must be superior to and, where it conflicts with, takes
precedence over national law or directives issued by any governmental au-
thority" and that a "directive to violate international criminal common law
is therefore void and can afford no protection.. . ."50 The Second Circuit
expanded upon these recognitions in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala with respect
to torture when recognizing that "the torturer has become-like the pirate
and slave trader before him--hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind."
51
sovereign acts. In such cases it is considered that the accused state did not act within the
ambit of its capacity as a sovereign. Acts contrary tojus cogens norms are null and void, and
cannot constitute a source of legal rights or privileges, such as the claim to immunity .... ),
affd Case No. 11/2000 (May 4, 2000); see also Maria Gavouneli, International Decision:
Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany. Case No. 11/2000. Areios Pagos
(Hellenic Supreme Court), May 4, 2000, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 198 (2001)). See Regina v. Bartle
(the Pinochet case), 381 I.L.M. 581 (House of Lords, Mar. 24, 1999), (Browne-Wilkinson,
L.J., sep. op.) (Hutton, L.J., sep. op.); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166,
1182, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting) ( "a state is never entitled to immunity for
any act that contravenes ajus cogens norm, regardless of where or against whom that act was
perpetrated ... the state cannot be performing a sovereign act entitled to immunity" and
"Germany could not have helped but realize that it might one day be held accountable for its
heinous actions by any other state, including the United States"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577
F.Supp. 860, 862-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ( "there is no... justifiable offense to" a foreign state
when jurisdiction is exercised over torture and domestic "immunities for government per-
sonnel or other such exemptions or limitations" cannot be used to obviate suits for violations
of international law under the Alien Tort Claims Act). See Inter-American Convention on the
Forced Disappearance of Persons art. IX, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1529, 1531 (1994) ("The
acts constituting forced disappearance shall not be deemed to have been committed in the
course of military duties [and p]rivileges, immunities, or special dispensations shall not be
admitted"), EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. , ch. IV, § 54 (1797) ("The
Prince. . . who would in his transports of fury take away the life of an innocent person, di-
vests himself of his character, and is not longer to be considered in any other light than that
of an unjust and outrageous enemy"). See also supra note 48.
50 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 462, 489, 508 (1950). See also French case of Abetz, in
William W. Bishop, Jr., Judicial Decisions, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 161, 162 (1952) (recognizing
the nonimmunity of a diplomat and stating that the court cannot "subordinate the prosecution
[of war crimes] to the authorization of the country where the guilty person belongs."); Hen-
field's Case, 11 F.Cas. 1099, 1104 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Jay, C.J., on circuit) (one
should not obey an order of a "sovereign having no right to command what is contrary to the
law of nature.").
" 630 F.2d 876, 890 (1980). Furthermore, a pirate "cannot upon any ground claim im-
munity." Dole v. New England Mutual Marine Ins. Co., 7 F. Cas. 837, 847 (C.C.D. Mass.
1864) (No. 3,966) (1864) (Clifford, J., on circuit).
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III. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BE SUBSTITUTED IN U.S. CIVIL SUITS
The fact that international crimes are beyond the lawful authority of
any state, are ultra vires and, therefore, cannot be lawful "official" acts is
critically important with respect to proper interpretation of federal statutes,
since under the venerable Supreme Court doctrine known as The Charming
Betsy rule a court must interpret relevant federal legislation consistently
with international law.52 More particularly, federal statutes that might oth-
erwise allow substitution of the U.S. as a defendant in lawsuits brought in
U.S. federal courts against former Bush Administration officials for ordi-
nary violations of domestic law should be interpreted consistently with in-
ternational law to avoid substitution of the U.S. with respect to acts that are
criminal under international law and beyond the lawful authority of any
government. Under The Charming Betsy rule, the 1988 Federal Employees
Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act (1988 Act),53 which in sub-
section (b)(1) generally provides that the U.S. be substituted as a defendant
and that claims are to proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act [FTCA] 54
if claims arise out of the wrongful act of a federal employee "acting within
the scope of his official duties' 55 must be interpreted consistently with rele-
52 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804) ("[A]n
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate... rights ... fur-
ther than is warranted by the law of nations."). Importantly, Chief Justice Marshall's famous
recognition added the point that statutes "can never be construed to violate" rights under
international law, although international law might place limits on such rights. There were
other early recognitions of this fundamental rule of construction. See, e.g., Talbot v. Seeman,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (stating that the municipal
law is strengthened by the law of nations). See also id. at 53; Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2
Dali.) 160, 162 (Pa. 1792) (stating that the municipal laws of the U.S. enforce the law of
nations); Miller v. The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 1, 4 (1781); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 297,
299-300 (1865) (discussing how the laws of nations "constitute a part of the laws of the
land") 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 362-63 (1859) (stating that laws operating on the interests and
rights of other States must be executed according to the law of nations); The Ship Rose, 36
Ct. Cl. 290, 301 (1901) (declaring that international law prevails over any conflict between
the municipal law of the United States and international law); The Schooner Nancy, 27 Ct.
Cl. 99, 109 (1892); Rutgers v. Waddington, Mayor's Court of the City of New York (1784),
in SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY 1674-1784, 302 (1935) (con-
struing the 1783 N.Y. Trespass Act consistently with the Treaty of Peace)), discussed in 1
THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 413-14 (Julius Goebel ed., 1964); GORDON S.
WOOD, TE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 457-58 (1969); PAUST ET
AL., supra note 5, at 153-54. The rule has modern recognition. See, e.g., id. at 154; infra
note 84.
" 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006).
54 Id. § 1346.
15 Id. § 2679(b)(1). In addition to an outside the "scope of official duties" exception re-
garding substitution, there is a "violation of a federal statute" exception. See id. § 2679(b)(2).
Since war crimes violate two sets of federal legislation (see, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW,
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vant international law. Since violations of international criminal law are
ultra vires and beyond the lawful authority of any government, and no gov-
ernment can lawfully delegate authority to commit international crimes,56
the 1988 Act should be interpreted to recognize that a federal employee who
commits an international crime is not "acting within the scope of his official
duties.' 57
supra note 1, at 5, 32, 145 n.47, 189 n.5 1), it would seem that a war crime is a "violation of a
federal statute" within the meaning of § 2679(b)(2). The same point would pertain with re-
spect to torture in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.
56 Supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. See also supra note 48.
57 See Karen Line, Note, An Unintended Double Standard of Liability: The Effect of the
Westfall Act on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1718, 1745-48 (2008) (ar-
guing that the legislative history's exception for egregious misconduct should apply with
respect to egregious violations of international law); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and
Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of
Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 853 n.154 (2005) (hereinafter Paust, Executive
Plans and Authorizations]. But see circuit and district court cases that apparently did not
even consider, much less adhere to, the requirement set forth in the Supreme Court's Charm-
ing Betsy rule regarding interpretation of any federal statute: In re Iraq and Afghanistan
Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d. 85, 109-12 (D.D.C. 2007); Alvarez-Machain v. Unit-
ed States, 331 F.3d 604, 631-32 (9th Cir. 2003) (substitution of the United States for defen-
dants affirmed because the ATCA creates a cause of action for violations of international
law); Harbury v. Hayden, 444 F. Supp. 2d 19, 37 (D.D.C. 2006) ("an alleged violation of
international law cannot prevent" substitution of the United States for defendants), affd, 522
F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 195 (2008); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F.
Supp. 2d 26, 31, 38 (D.D.C. 2006) (substitution of the United States for defendants occurred
even though "substitution effectively grants the defendants absolute immunity for violations
of international law"), aff'd sub nom. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated
by 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008); Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-0 1809, 2005 WL 2375202, at
*34 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2000) (substitution of the United States for defendants was granted
and the claim was then dismissed because "United States has not waived its sovereign im-
munity from suits seeking money damages under international law."), aff'd in part, rev 'd in
part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2nd Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008); Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, No. 02-02240, 2004 WL
5584378, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2004) (substitution of the United States for defendant was
granted despite allegation that conduct violated jus cogens norms), aff'd on other grounds,
449 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Bancoult v. McNamara, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C.
2004) (substitution of the United States for defendant was granted because violations of
international law do not trigger one of the express exceptions to substitution), aff'd, 445 F.3d
427 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251,268 (D.D.C. 2004) (subs-
titution of the United States for the defendant granted and then the action was barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, because "immunity cannot be implied unless a government
has 'indicated its amenability to suit' even for the most heinous of crimes against interna-
tional law" (citing Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir.
1994)), aff'd, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
Some cases have also recognized an exception more generally with respect to egregious
misconduct. See, e.g., Monfore v. United States, 47 F.3d 1175, 1995 WL 66786, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3365 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (affirming denial of substitu-
tion because defendant's defamatory statements were a substantial deviation from his profes-
sional duties and, therefore, not within the scope of his employment). See Wood v. United
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An additional reason why treaty law must be used has been noted in
another writing:
[Since] the 1988 Act and the FTCA are prior in time to ratification of the
two treaties mentioned above [i.e., the ICCPR and the CAT] that [require
personal liability and] deny any form of immunity [u]nder the last in time
rule the treaties must prevail; and they would prevail even if the legislation
was enacted subsequent to ratification of the treaties under the "rights un-
der a treaty" exception to the last in time rule.58
Therefore, even if substitution might be possible under an improper
interpretation of the 1988 Act (i.e., one that did not follow the Supreme
Court's mandate in The Charming Betsy and that did not use relevant inter-
national law for proper interpretation of the phrase "acting within the scope
of ... official duties"), under the last in time rule, treaty law of the U.S.
affirming the need for personal liability must necessarily trump the incon-
sistent prior legislation, and substitution of the U.S. for individual defen-
dants under the prior legislation should not occur.
An added concern can arise if government lawyers are used to de-
fend those reasonably accused of international crime since "it would be pro-
fessionally unethical for lawyers who are responsible for prosecution of war
crimes on behalf of the United States ... to defend former members of the
government who are so reasonably accused .... The clash of interests at
stake could not be more sharply delineated., 59 The same concern can arise
when a U.S. attorney must represent a foreign state requesting extradition
during an extradition hearing in a federal court.
States, 995 F.2d 1122, 1127 (1st Cir. 1993) (legislative history "suggests that the Act does
not allow an immunity [substitution] certificate simply to deny ... an alleged killing, rape,
assault, or some other 'egregious misconduct."') (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 1
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5949 ("[I]f an employee is accused of egre-
gious misconduct, rather than mere negligence or poor judgment, then the United States may
not be substituted as the defendant, and the individual employee remains liable.")), overruled
by Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007); Foster v. Hill, No. 05-C-6175, 2006 WL 1430552,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (because defendant struck victim with weight bar, he was not acting
within the scope of his employment under Illinois law, and, therefore, substitution was de-
nied), appeal dismissed, 497 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 2007). Dictum in Justice Ginsburg's
majority opinion in Osborn declared: "If a plaintiff charges a federal employee with sexual
assault,... upon determining that there was sexual contact, a district court could find that the
employee acted outside the scope of his duties." 549 U.S. at 251, n. 15. If sexual assault is
"outside the scope," it must also be apparent that torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment violative of international law are also "outside the scope."
58 Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations, supra note 57, at 852-53 (citing PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 101402, 104-05, 120 (with respect to the last in time
rule and its exceptions)).
59 Jordan J. Paust, Defend Yoo or End Impunity?, JURIST, Feb. 11, 2009, http://jurist.law.
pitt.edu/forumy/2009/02/defend-yoo-or-end-impunity.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
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With respect to sanction policies for crimes under international law,
substitution of the U.S. for the criminally accused would not promote deter-
rence of criminal conduct, 60 ensure the need for personal accountability and
60 Concerning judicial attention to the need to deter others from similar conduct in the
future, see, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2620-21, n.9 (2008) (punitive
damages are "aimed... principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct."); Gates v.
Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 74 (D.D.C. 2008) (addressing the "two-fold"
purpose of punitive damages: "to punish those who engage in outrageous conduct and to
deter others from similar conduct in the future."); Campuzano et al. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 279 (D.D.C. 2003) ("only a large amount of punitive damages can
serve as an effective deterrent against future terrorist acts"); Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F.
Supp. 2d 179, 223-24 (D.D.C. 2003) (Iraqi subjection of U.S. POWs "to intense interroga-
tion and torture" "repugnant to civilized society... [and] carried out by defendants as part of
a systematic effort to obtain information" justified punitive damages, "deterring torture of
POWs should be of the highest priority," "[p]unitive damages are particularly appropriate in
seeking to deter terrorist states from engaging in heinous acts ... , including torture," and
"[o]nly a very sizable award would be likely to deter the torture of American POWs ... in
the future"); Cronin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 235 (D.D.C. 2002)
("Punitive damages are awarded to punish a defendant for particularly egregious conduct,
and to serve as a deterrent to future conduct of the same type."); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198
F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1360 ("[p]unitive damages are designed both to punish and to teach a
defendant, and to deter others from committing the same abuses"); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Re-
public of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2000); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.
Supp. 1239, 1250-51 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (dual purpose of punitive damages is "to punish truly
reprehensible conduct" and to "deter others from committing similar conduct").
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has declared: "The State is under a duty to
use all means available to fight the situation of impunity surrounding the instant case, as
impunity fosters the chronic repetition of human rights violations and the total defenseless-
ness of the victims and their next of kin .... Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/ser. C./No.162 (Nov. 29, 2006), 222. The court also clarified what sort of measures
are required in this regard:
Therefore, further to its duty to investigate and, if appropriate, punish the guilty
parties, the State is required to remove all obstacles-both factual and legal-
contributing to impunity, and use all available means to expedite the investigation
and the relevant proceedings, thus preventing the recurrence of acts as serious as
those under analysis in the case at hand. The State may not rely upon any domestic
law or regulation to justify its failure to comply with the Court's order to investi-
gate and, if appropriate, criminally punish the parties responsible for the La Cantu-
ta events. Particularly, as has been the case ever since the Court's judgment in the
case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, the State may never apply amnesty laws-which will
produce no effects in the future... raise the statute of limitations, non-ex post fac-
to nature of criminal laws or res judicata defenses, or rely upon the principle of
double jeopardy.., or resort to any other similar measure designed to eliminate re-
sponsibility in order to escape its duty to investigate and punish those responsible.
Accordingly, as the case may be, the relevant investigations need to be opened
against all parties investigated, convicted, or acquitted or whose cases were dis-
missed, in a military criminal proceeding.
Id. 226.
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atonement, 61 sensitize elites to more adequately condition their future beha-
vior, or best serve the rule of law.62 Substitution usually results in dismissal
because immunity of the U.S. pertains. 63 Substitution is, therefore, a men-
dacious form of judicial process that can ultimately deny justice.64 Given
this common result, when substitution and dismissal occur, the U.S. is not in
compliance with treaty-based and customary international law that requires
equal access to courts and the availability of judicial remedies for violations
of international law. Substitution and dismissal would especially violate
Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR, which expressly mandates that victims "shall
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been com-
mitted by persons acting in an official capacity.,
65
61 See Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1359 (punitive damages are "an
appropriate, if not essential, mechanism for upholding prohibitions of human rights abuses
reviled by the international community."); id. at 1360 (quoted supra note 60); Paul v. Avril,
901 F. Supp. 330, 336 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ("punitive damages must reflect the egregiousness of
the defendant's conduct, the central role he played in the abuses, and the international con-
demnation with which these abuses are viewed."), quoted in Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co.,
Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. at
864 ("the objective of the international law making torture punishable as a crime can only be
vindicated by imposing punitive damages"), id at 865 (remedy of punitive damages should
pertain "in order to give effect to the manifest objectives of the international prohibition
against torture"); supra note 60.
62 See Elaine Scarry, Presidential Crimes. Moving on is Not an Option, BOSTON REv.
(Sept.-Oct. 2008), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR33.5/scany.php ("The incalculable
damage left by Bush and Cheney's day-in-and-day-out contempt for national and interna-
tional law includes the power to ... trivialize into a matter of personal preference any future
president's adherence to the law. Will we become a country in which the rule of law is just
another policy preference?").
63 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture all in a Day's Work? Scope of Employment,
the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human Rights Litigation against US. Federal Offi-
cials, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175 (2008); supra note 57.
64 Denial of justice is a violation of customary international law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 711 & cmts. a, c, RN 2
(1987); PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 225, 287-88 n.481 ("One can scarcely
conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of having access to the
courts .... The principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being submitted to a
judge ranks as one of the universally "recognized" fundamental principles of law; the same is
true of the principle of international law which forbids the denial of justice.") (quoting Gold-
er v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), I 34-35 (1975)).
65 ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2(3)(a). Of course, if the acts are ultra vires they cannot be
acting in an official capacity, but the requirement that there be an effective remedy nonethe-
less pertains.
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IV. IMMUNITY DOES NOT PERTAIN BECAUSE OF THE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS ACT
It is of further interest that the 2006 Military Commissions Act
(MCA)66 will not provide immunity from suits for violations of treaty law
of the U.S. or customary international law. Section 5 of the MCA had at-
tempted to deny use by any person of "the Geneva Conventions or any pro-
tocols thereto in any . . . civil action or proceeding to which the United
States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed
Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in
any court of the United States or its States or territories. 67 With respect to
future litigation, the language did not attempt to deny use of (1) customary
international law reflected in Geneva law; (2) the 1907 Hague Convention
No. IV and customary laws of war reflected therein; (3) any other customa-
ry laws of war; (4) related treaty-based or customary human rights law; (5)
Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture; (6) any other federal statute
as a "source of rights"; or (7) use of the Ninth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion for incorporation of human rights of U.S. nationals,68 which in any
event must trump an inconsistent statute. Therefore, despite the attempt in
Section 5 of the MCA to deny use of the Geneva Conventions as a source of
rights, lawsuits are possible, for example, under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA or ATS) with respect to other violations of international law;69 the
Torture Victim Protection Act with respect to torture or extrajudicial killing
as defined therein; 70 and-in the case of alleged U.S. victims of terrorist
66 Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2631-32 (2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
67 Id. § 5(a).
68 Concerning human rights of U.S. nationals under the Ninth Amendment, see, e.g.,
PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 323-26, 331-32, 336-40.
69 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) [hereinafter ATCA]. By express terms, this
statute is only available for alien plaintiffs but expressly applies with respect to any treaty of
the U.S. and the customary law of nations. The ATCA executes both forms of international
law.
70 TVPA, supra note 9. This statute provides a cause of action for alien and U.S. plaintiffs
for torture and extrajudicial killing provided that the defendant acts "under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation." Id. § 2(a). It is possible for a U.S. national
to do so. Section 3(b)(2) of the TVPA has a far more limiting definition of torture involving
mental pain or suffering than the CAT. See CAT, supra note 3. Since the CAT was ratified
on October 21, 1994, after the TVPA had been created, the treaty is last in time and must
prevail as domestic law of the United States. Concerning the last in time rule, see, e.g.,
PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 100-01, 120. When the United States ratified
the CAT, a unilateral understanding in the instrument of ratification considered that mental
suffering must be "prolonged" and result from one of four listed causes, but the understand-
ing was incorrect and is not legally relevant. See Paust, Torture, supra note 1, at 1570 n. 107.
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tactics and their estates, survivors, or heirs-the Antiterrorism Act (ATS). 71
More generally, lawsuits for war crimes and crimes against humanity might
also be possible under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.72 Additionally, lawsuits are possi-
ble under state law, especially since rights of access to courts and to reme-
dies under treaty-based and customary international law are the supreme
law of the land under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.73 In
fact, a number of state court decisions have addressed war crime and human
rights liability.74
71 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2006). This statute provides a cause of action for U.S. plaintiffs and
their estates, survivors, or heirs for "terrorism" (as broadly defined in § 2331) and allows
treble damages, attorney fees, and costs. An exception exists with respect to a present (not
former) "officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting within his or
her official capacity or under color of legal authority." Id. § 2337(1). The section, like any
federal statute, must be interpreted consistently with international law (see supra note 52) by
recognizing that when one is engaged in international criminal conduct, one is not "acting
within... official" capacity or under "legal" authority. See supra notes 48-51 and accompa-
nying text.
72 See, e.g., Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, 1993 WL 814304 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 72 F.3d 844
(11 th Cir. 1996) (but focusing on the ATCA re: subject matter jurisdiction, id. at 846-48);
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. at 178 (regarding use of § 1331 in the alternative with the
TVPA); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 887 n.22 ("We recognize that our reasoning might also sustain
jurisdiction under the general federal question jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We
prefer, however, to rest our decision upon the Alien Tort Statute, in light of that provision's
close coincidence with the jurisdictional facts presented in this case."). This point was ad-
dressed but not decided in Kadic v. Karadi, 70 F.3d at 246 (the "causes of action [in this
case] are statutorily authorized, and.., we need not rule definitely on whether any causes of
action not specifically authorized by statute may be implied by international law.., as in-
corporated into United States law and grounded on section 1331 jurisdiction."), the court
agreeing nonetheless that a more specific statute, the ATCA, provides subject matter jurisdic-
tion and that "jurisdiction" can rest on § 1331 or the ATCA.
73 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. The express mandate of the Constitution is that "all" treaties
of the United States shall be supreme law of the land for use by states and supremacy pur-
poses. Regarding the supremacy and operation of all treaties, see, e.g., PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 67-71, 79, 81-83, 115-16, 361-62; Jordan J. Paust,
Medellin, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties and Relevant Executive Authority, 31 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 301, 315-16, 318-20, 327 (2008). Regarding the rich history, suprema-
cy, and operation of customary international law, see, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 3, at 10, 53-54 n.63, 116; PAUST ET AL., supra note 5, at 579-81 (citing numerous
cases); Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the Founders, Framers, and
Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law of Nations, 14 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 205, 245-51 (2008) [hereinafter Paust, Founders & Framers].
74 See, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 226-27, 291-92 nn.488-95. Of
particular interest is Christian County Court v. Rankin & Tharp, 63 Ky. 502, 505-06 (1866)
There must be a remedy, and of that remedy the State judiciary has jurisdiction.
There is nothing in the Federal Constitution which deprives a State court of power
to decide a question of international law incidentally involved in a case over which
it has jurisdiction; and for every wrong the common law ... provides an adequate
remedy. To sustain this action, therefore, it is not necessary to invoke any statutory
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In any event, it is clear that Congress has no power to obviate the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court75 or to violate the separation of
powers by substantially interfering with judicial power and attempting to
control rules for decision. The latter purpose and effect is exactly what Sec-
tion 5 of the MCA attempted with respect to judicial use of the 1949 Gene-
va Conventions and, therefore, it should be recognized that the attempt is
inoperative as a violation of the separation of powers.76 Even if Section 5
could be operative, the attempt in Section 5 to deny claims under the Gene-
va Conventions "as a source of rights" in cases before the courts would nec-
essarily be trumped either by the venerable "rights under" treaties excep-
tion 77 or by the law of war exception 78 to the last in time rule, since rights
aid .... Wherefore, on international and common law principles, we adjudge that
the petition in this case sets forth a good cause of action ....
Id.
75 See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810) (the "appellate
powers of this court" are not created by statute but are "given by the constitution"), quoted in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575 (2006).
76 Concerning the attempted reach of the 2006 MCA, see Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law:
Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Do-
mestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 345, 414-15
(2007) [hereinafter Paust, Above the Law]. In this article I wrote that:
Congress has no power to violate the separation of powers by such a blatant denial
of a constitutionally mandated, traditional, and essential judicial power to imple-
ment treaty law of the United States that, as the Constitution expressly requires,
"shall extend to all cases ... arising under... treaties."
The violation of the separation of powers in this instance is especially evident
where federal courts have continuing jurisdiction in all cases arising under treaties
and Congress attempts to substantially inhibit judicial independence by controlling
the results in certain cases. Congress is attempting precisely that by prescribing
rules for decision in a particular way or, in this instance, rights and rules of law
contained in the Geneva Conventions that cannot be used for decision. This con-
gressional effort to deny use of particular law and to control judicial decision of
cases in a particular way is all the more blatant where Congress has attempted to
deny judicial use of common Article 3 as a rule for decision in detainee cases after
the Supreme Court clearly decided that common Article 3 is a primary rule for de-
cision [in Hamdan].
Id. at 414-15.
77 The "rights under" treaties exception is documented in Supreme Court and other cases.
See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211,
247 (1872); Reichart v. Felps, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 160, 165-66 (1867); Wilson v. Wall, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 83, 89 (1867); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 631-32 (1857)
(Curtis, J., dissenting); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 749, 755 (1835);
PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 104-05, 120, 137-39 nn.39-49, revised from
28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393, 410-14 (1988). See also Smith v. Stevens, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 321,
327 (1870) (stating that a joint resolution of Congress could not relate back to give validity to
a land conveyance that was void under a treaty); Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 223,
232-33 (1850) (an 1836 act of Congress could not "help the patent, it being of later date than
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under the Geneva Conventions are both "rights under" treaties and part of
the laws of war.79 Moreover, the Conventions expressly mandate that no
state "shall be allowed to absolve itself... of any liability incurred., 80
Section 7 of the MCA attempted a broader denial of rights of cer-
tain aliens to bring "any other action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or condi-
tions of confinement ... . ,,8 As noted elsewhere, Section 7 was a flagrant
"denial of justice" under customary international law and of peremptory
the treaty" of 1824 which had conferred part of the title to property in others); Chase v. Unit-
ed States, 222 F. 593, 596 (8th Cir. 1915) ("Congress has no power. . . to affect rights...
granted by a treaty"), rev'd on other gds., 245 U.S. 89 (1917); Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F.
Cas. 493, 494-96 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366) (Johnson, J., on circuit) (state law attempt-
ing to allow seizure of "free negroes and persons of color" on ships that come into its harbors
directly conflicts with the "paramount and exclusive" federal commerce power, "the treaty-
making power," and "laws and treaties of the United States" by "converting a right into a
crime," and a plea of necessity to protect state security does not obviate the primacy of the
laws and treaties of the U.S. Further, a restriction of a treaty right by legislation, "even by the
general government," cannot prevail).
78 The second exception to the last in time rule in these cases would be the law of war
exception, which guarantees the primacy of the laws of war. See, e.g., Miller v. United
States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 315-15 (1870) (Field, J., dissenting); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) (Chase, J.) ("If a general war is declared [by Congress], its extent and
operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a part of the law of
nations"--thus recognizing that congressional power is restricted by the laws of war); 11 Op.
Att'y Gen. 297, 299-300 (1865) ("Congress cannot abrogate [the "laws of war"] ... laws of
nations... are of binding force upon the departments and citizens of the Government ....
Congress cannot abrogate them or authorize their infraction. The Constitution does not per-
mit this Government [to do so either]"); PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 106-
07, 120, 141-42 nn.52-57; 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1980 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Gallatin) ("By
virtue of... [the war power], Congress could... [act], provided it be according to the laws
of nations and to treaties."), quoted in United States ex rel. Schlueter v. Watkins, 67 F. Supp.
556, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); see also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931),
overruled on other gds., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) (the war power
"tolerates no qualifications or limitations, unless found in the Constitution or in applicable
principles of international law."); Tyler v. Defirees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331, 354-55 (1871)
(Field, J., dissenting); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 77 (coun-
sel arguing that "[a]s far as Congress have thought proper to legislate us into a state of war,
the law of nations in war is to apply").
79 See Paust, Above the Law, supra note 76, at 379-80, nn.91-92, 412 n.196, 418 n.21 1.
But see Noriega v. Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290, 1296 (1 1th Cir. 2009) (ruling that Section 5 of
the MCA "has superseded whatever domestic effect the Geneva Conventions may have in
actions such as this" because the statute "' which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a
treaty."' (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 18 (1957))), but not considering either the "rights under" treaties exception or the law
of war exception to the last in time rule, much less the evident violation of the separation of
powers noted above).
80 Supra note 17.
"i See Pub. L. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
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rights of access to courts, rights to a remedy, and equality of treatment un-
der several multilateral and bilateral treaties of the U.S. and customary in-
ternational law. 82 Additionally,
[s]uch a sweeping denial of treaty-based requirements is also a violation of
the separation of powers, as it attempts to control judicial decision and to
deny the judiciary its time-honored and essential role of applying funda-
mental and peremptory rights and requirements contained in treaty law of
the United States. 83
Another reason why Section 7 cannot be operative against treaty-
based rights is that a venerable Supreme Court rule of construction requires
the primacy of any relevant treaty unless Congress has expressed within a
subsequent federal statute a clear and unequivocal intent to override a par-
ticular treaty. 84 There is no such clear and unequivocal expression of con-
gressional intent in Section 7 with respect to any treaty, and the only rele-
vant expression in the MCA is in Section 5 with respect to the Geneva Con-
ventions. Additionally, if even operative, Section 7 would be trumped by
both the "rights under" treaties and law of war exceptions to the last in time
rule. 85 Furthermore, as noted above, the Geneva Conventions expressly
mandate that no state shall be able to absolve itself of liability.8 6 For these
82 See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 98, 261-62 nn.116-117. Concerning
the violation of customary international law known as a "denial of justice," see, e.g., supra
note 64.
83 PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 98.
84 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982) (a "congressional expression [to
override is] necessary"); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (the purpose to
override or modify a treaty must be "clearly expressed" and "[a] treaty will not be deemed to
have been abrogated or modified [domestically] by a later statute unless such purpose on the
part of Congress has been clearly expressed"); Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 336,
345-46 (1925) (the "Act must be construed with the view to preserve treaty rights unless
clearly annulled, and we cannot conclude ... a congressional intent absolutely to exclude");
United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221 (1902) (the "purpose. .. must appear clear-
ly and distinctly from the words used" by Congress); PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 3, at 99, 107, 120, 124-125 nn.2-3, and other cases cited. See also Spector v. Norwe-
gian Cruise Line, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 142 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Beharry v. Re-
no, 183 F. Supp.2d 584, 593-602 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (regarding statutory construction consis-
tent with the ICCPR and other international law); United States v. The Palestine Liberation
Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Only where a treaty is irre-
concilable with a later enacted statute and Congress has clearly evinced an intent to super-
sede a treaty ... does the later enacted statute take precedence ... and its progeny... require
the clearest of expressions on the part of Congress." (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581, 599-602 (1889) (finding clear intent to supersede); Edye v. Robertson (The Head
Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884) (same); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S.
536 (1884)).
85 See supra notes 77-78.
86 Supra note 17.
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reasons, the MCA should pose no barrier to litigation of claims under inter-
national law.
Moreover, if Sections 5 or 7 of the MCA had been operative, there
would have been war crime responsibility for its creators under the laws of
war. Article 23(h) of the 1907 Hague Convention affirms a relevant custo-
mary violation of the laws of war when stressing that "it is especially for-
bidden... [t]o declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of
law the rights ... of nationals of the hostile party., 87 This type of crime led
to prosecutions in United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case)88 during
the Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings under U.S. auspices when the in-
dictment included war crimes involving "discriminatory measures against
Jews, Poles, 'gypsies,' and other designated 'asocials' [that] resulted in...
deprivations of rights to file private suits and rights of appeal.
89
Rights of hostile foreign nationals under the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and the 1907 Hague Convention operative during the wars in Afgha-
nistan and Iraq are clearly among the relevant rights that cannot be declared
abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law. Members of the
Obama Administration and the judiciary should be careful that they do not
declare that such rights are abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court
of law under Sections 5 or 7 of the MCA, or in any other way. Additionally,
the Obama Administration should not facilitate such a denial of rights if
they wish to avoid possible accomplice liability. 90
87 HC IV, supra note 15, Annex, art. 23(h). The treaty reflects customary international
law. See also supra note 15. See also Geneva Convention, supra note 17, art. 148 (quoted
text at supra note 17).
88 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 3 (1951).
89 Id. 16.
90 Concerning complicity under international law, see, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 15, at 44-49; Paust, Torture, supra note 1, at 1544-45. With respect to
accomplice liability in civil cases, see, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., 504
F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242
(11th Cir. 2005); Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005); Doe I
v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947-53 (9th Cir. 2002); Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp.2d
257, 287-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp.2d 457,
463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No C 99-02506, 2007 WL 2349341, at
*4 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp.2d 7,
53 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp.2d 1112, 1148-49 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (role of
defendant "as a direct participant, conspirator, accomplice and aider and abettor," and our
courts "have recognized that principles of accomplice liability apply under the ATCA to
those who assist others in the commission of torts that violate customary international law"
and "[p]rinciples of accomplice liability are well-established under international law"); Es-
tate of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 304 F. Supp.2d 232 (D.R.I. 2004); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.2d 289, 320-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp.2d at 1355-56; Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F.
Supp.2d at 127-28; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). See also Wiwa
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More generally, the Founders, Framers, and early judiciary affirmed
the fundamental expectation that Congress is bound by the law of nations. 91
They also recognized that judicial power exists to identify, clarify, and ap-
ply international law. 92 As Chief Justice Marshall recognized concerning the
textual commitment to the judiciary of authority to decide cases arising un-
der treaties and a test for self operative status and treaty-based remedies,
"[t]he reason for inserting that clause [in Article III of the Constitution] was,
that all persons who have real claims under a treaty should have their causes
decided" by the judiciary and that "[w]henever a right grows out of, or is
protected by, a treaty, . . . whoever may have this right, it is to be protected"
by the judiciary.93 One year later, Marshall confirmed a fundamental expec-
tation of the Framers with respect to judicial power and human rights when
he recognized that our judicial tribunals "are established . . . to decide on
human rights., 94 Chief Justice Marshall also confirmed a fundamental ex-
pectation of the Founders and Framers that:
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28,
2002) (private corporation can be liable for "joint action" with state actors).
91 See, e.g., Paust, Founders & Framers, supra note 73, at 217-39.
92 See also id. at 231-36, 239; Jordan J. Paust, The History, Nature, and Reach of the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 249, 258-62 (2004).
93 Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809). Clearly, a right
that "grows out of' or is "protected by" a treaty can be an implied right, an express right, and
a right that is evident even though the treaty contains no mention of various forms of remedy
that might attach. This type of test was reiterated by Justice Miller in 1884. See Edye v.
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) (Miller, J., opinion) ("whenever its provisions pre-
scribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined." (em-
phasis added)). A number of Supreme Court cases have also recognized that treaties are to be
construed in a broad manner to protect express and implied rights. See, e.g., Factor v. Lau-
benheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51 (1929); Jordan
v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924)
("Treaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are
possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to
them, the latter is to be preferred."); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924)
("Construing the treaty liberally in favor of the rights claimed under it, as we are bound to
do ...."); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) ("where a treaty admits of two
constructions, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to
them, the latter is to be preferred."); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879)
("Where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to the rights, that may be
claimed under it, and the other liberal, the latter is to be preferred." (citing Shanks v. Dupont,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 249 (1830) ("If the treaty admits of two interpretations, and one is li-
mited, and the other liberal; one which will further, and the other exclude private rights; why
should not the most liberal exposition be adopted?")).
94 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810). Concerning the rich history of
Founder, Framer, and judicial attention to human rights (which are generally at stake in these
cases) and their use in thousands of federal and state cases, see, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 3, at 193-223.
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The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every in-
dividual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an in-
jury. . . . [Blackstone] says, "it is a general and indisputable rule, that
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at
law, whenever that right is invaded."
95
With respect to judicial power and the laws of war in particular, the
Supreme Court has stressed, "[f]rom the very beginning of its history this
Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the
law of nations which prescribes . . . the status, rights and duties of...
individuals. 96
V. CONCLUSION
As noted in Part 1I above, the CAT, ICCPR, Universal Declaration
of Human Rights through the U.N. Charter, American Convention on Hu-
man Rights, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, custo-
mary law regarding forced disappearance, customary human rights law, and
customary laws of war provide rights to compensation and forms of repara-
tion. The Geneva Conventions also expressly recognize private rights and
contemplate compensation in courts of law. 97 Federal statutes execute the
Geneva Conventions and other international law for civil sanction purposes,
95 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803). See also Miller v. Corn-
wall R.R., 168 U.S. 131, 134 (1897) (Fuller, J., opinion) (stating that "every man, for an
injury done.. ., shall have remedy" by due course of law, and quoting early Constitutions of
Pennsylvania); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884) (Matthews, J., opinion)
("To take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself.");
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 764 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring)
(the right "to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts" is among "fundamental
privileges and immunities which belong essentially to the citizens of every free govern-
ment"); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 536 (1839) (argument of counsel)
("under the law of nations," an individual deprived of a right under the law of nations "is
entitled to redress"); Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 216 (1828) (Story, J.) (address-
ing the "right of justice" concerning a violation of international law, Story adding "with
reference to principles of international law, he has a right, both to the justice of his own and
the foreign sovereign"); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 367 (1824) (Story, J.) (regard-
ing a violation of the law of nations by the U.S. Executive abroad, "justice demands that the
injured party should receive a suitable redress"); Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) at 348-49 (quoted in supra text accompanying note 93); Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1
U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 359 (1788) (argument of counsel) ("that every right must have a remedy
is a principle of general law"); Riggs v. Martin, 5 Ark. 506, 508 (1844) ("It is a maxim of
universal justice pervading the whole system of the common and civil law that wherever a
party has a legal right he is entitled to a legal remedy to enforce it."); THE FEDERALIST No. 43
(James Madison) (stating that "a right implies a remedy").
96 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27 (1942).
97 See supra note 18.
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and several U.S. cases have recognized personal liability for violations of
human rights law and the laws of war.
Additionally, as explained in Part III, there are various reasons why
no federal statute should be interpreted contrary to international law to ob-
viate civil liability of former President Bush, former Vice President Cheney,
Alberto Gonzales, and others for perpetration of and complicity with respect
to international crimes and the personal responsibility known as dereliction
of duty with respect to dejure and defacto leaders. Moreover, under the last
in time rule some seemingly limiting statutes regarding substitution of the
U.S. for individual defendants are prior in time to relevant treaties and,
however interpreted otherwise, must not prevail. Another federal statute, the
MCA, is subsequent in time to U.S. ratification of relevant treaties, but there
are several reasons why the MCA should not obviate jurisdiction in U.S.
courts. Even if the MCA might otherwise be operative, the "rights under"
treaties exception and the law of war exception to the last in time rule
should ensure the primacy of rights to an effective remedy and access to
courts under relevant international law.
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